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Abstract Here, in textbook style, is a concise biological
account of the evolution of morality. It addresses morality
on three levels: moral outcomes (behavioral genetics),
moral motivation or intent (psychology and neurology),
and moral systems (sociality). The rationale for teaching
this material is addressed in Allchin (2009). Classroom
resources (including accompanying images and video links)
and a discussion of teaching strategies are provided online
at: http://EvolutionOfMorality.net.
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A Biological Approach to Explaining Morality
Animals exhibit a wide range of behaviors. They forage.
They defend territory and flee predators. Sometimes they
play. They reproduce, at times with spectacular displays.
They learn. But perhaps most striking from an evolutionary
perspective, they sometimes cooperate or help others, even
at a cost to themselves. Why? Morality seems to defy the
image of natural selection as "selfish," favoring only traits
that benefit the individual in a competitive "struggle for
existence." Given the importance of morality for human
society, this puzzle is a major challenge for science. How
do biologists interpret such behavior? How could morality
originate in an evolutionary context?
• Morality is a form of behavior.
The first challenge for biologists is characterizing
morality in terms amenable to science. Abstract concepts
of “right” and “wrong” or virtuous motives and good
intentions must be expressed in terms of what can be
observed or measured. First, then, biologists address
morality concretely as a form of behavior. As such, it fits
in a context of other behaviors: foraging, mating and
nesting, securing territory, play, grooming, and other social
interactions.
• Nonhuman species may exhibit various stages in the
evolution of morality.
Conceptualizing morality as a form of behavior opens
the possibility of observing it in other species. Indeed, if
complex features evolve gradually, one might well expect
to find stages of protomorality, incipient morality, or
various precursors in organisms besides humans. An
important resource in understanding the evolution of
humans and their culture, then, is comparative behavior.
Even if the behavior is not strictly genetic, one may still
find informative phylogenetic patterns or similarities based
on common ancestry. Studies of primate behavior are
potentially valuable. Transitions and intermediate stages
may be more concretely envisioned or documented.
• Biologists borrow from other disciplines in characterizing
behavior as moral.
But which behaviors are “moral”? Here, biologists must
proceed cautiously. One cannot even identify the relevant
behaviors without a working concept of “right” and
“wrong” or of “morality.” Invoking a value judgment
threatens to prejudice the whole endeavor. The biologist's
proper approach is thereby indifferent and fluid, contingent
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on definitions of ethics identified by others. Biologists may
encounter multiple conceptions of what is to be explained.
Different benchmark definitions may yield separate com-
plementary explanations. Of course, biologists are accus-
tomed to addressing the “same” phenomenon on multiple
levels of organization: molecular and cellular, physiologi-
cal, populational, ecological, and evolutionary. Biologists
have, thus, developed a suite of explanations which apply
to different aspects of moral behavior.
• Philosophers identify at least three frameworks for
conceptualizing morality: moral outcomes, moral motives
(or intent), and moral systems.
For guidance, then, a biologist turns to moral philoso-
phers. Yet, even after centuries of reflection and debate,
philosophers themselves do not agree on core ethical
principles for defining “good.” They generally recognize,
however, three basic approaches. One approach, conse-
quentialism, focuses on the outcomes themselves. For
example, morality is assessed as the greatest good for the
greatest number. Good may be defined variously as benefit,
happiness, or pleasure. A contrasting approach, deontology,
emphasizes instead motives (or reasoning). For example,
morality is measured by feelings of sympathy or virtuous
intent. Both approaches draw on widely shared intuitions,
although they sometimes lead to different moral codes.
They have not yet been synthesized. A third, complemen-
tary strand of philosophical thought situates morality on yet
another level: the concept of a social contract. Morality is
characterized primarily by mutual consensus on values.
Biologists can inform each perspective, as described below
in separate sections (Table 1).
• Evolution itself does not express or yield values.
Nature may seem to exhibit its own values. For example,
natural selection may seem to "favor" adaptive traits.
Survival and reproduction may seem inherent values
because they lead to continuity of the lineage. However,
historical facts are distinct from values. Effects do not
indicate intentions. Patterns of causation do not reflect
processes of evaluation. A falling body does not reflect a
value of gravity. Two charged particles do not reflect a
value of electrical attraction. In the same way, reproduction
and survival do not reflect a value of evolution. As
exemplified in extinction, species do not "need" to be
perpetuated. As exemplified in sterile insect castes and non-
fertile individuals, single organisms do not "need" to
reproduce themselves. The language of natural "selection"
may easily mislead one to personify nature inappropriately.
Recognizing such tendencies may be important in avoiding
mistaken impressions.
• Science is limited to description.
Biological analysis may enrich our understanding of
morality, but it is also limited. Science is not able to discover
ethical principles in nature, nor to justify them, nor to evaluate
them, say, based on evolutionary history, nor even to develop
them based on some presumed universal or "objective"
principle of "human nature." Many have tried. All have failed
(Farber 1994; Bradie 1994). Rather, the achievable aim is to
explain how organisms such as humans evolved moral
capacities to form moral concepts and to act on them in
particular environments. That may also involve describing
how, as organisms, they are able to do so (neurologically,
cognitively, emotionally, and socially). To describe morality
as a practice is not to prescribe any particular moral rule. To
explain the behavior is not to justify it. Facts and values (is
and ought) are conceptually distinct. Charles Darwin (1871),
in his own presentation, notably limited the scope of his
analysis to the "natural history" of ethics (p. 71). Still,
knowing how and why (historically) we value things may
fruitfully guide reflections on the process. Having introduced
these caveats, then, let us consider what biologists have
discovered about morality as an evolved form of behavior.
Moral Outcomes (Behavioral Genetics)
• Cooperation and helping behavior are simple evolution-
ary puzzles.
Evolution provides an important context for interpreting
moral behavior, interpreted solely in terms of outcomes—
regardless of motive or intent. Some behaviors or disposi-
tions—not all—are partly hereditary (innate or instinct). To
the degree that they are, they are subject to natural
selection. Such behaviors will thus tend to promote an
individual's relative fitness. Moral behavior seems an
exception. Cooperation or helping may enhance the fitness
of another organism. Any behavior that involves a cost (or
decreased fitness) to the individual seems ruled out by
evolutionary principles. Biologists have solved this puzzle
in various ways, as described below.
Behavior Moral philosophy Biological science
Moral outcomes Consequentialism Behavioral genetics
Moral motives/intent Deontology Neurophysiology and psychology
Moral systems Social contract Sociality and communication
Table 1 Complementary types
of explanations of moral behav-
ior, reflecting multiple philo-
sophical interpretations of ethics
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• Organisms may cooperate when each benefits.
Behavior that benefits other organisms may sometimes
also benefit the individual. In such cases, no conflict arises.
For example, mutualisms are common in nature: insect
pollination of flowers; animal dispersal of seeds; the ant–
acacia symbiosis; and various endosymbionts (bacteria/
termites, algae/nudibranchs; mitochondria; chloroplasts).
Such interactions between species illustrate how organisms
may adapt through mutually beneficial behavior, even
where the exchange is not conscious.
The same principle applies for interactions within
species. Even if organisms compete for the same resources,
they may also establish mutually beneficial relationships.
For example, predators (such as wolves, hyenas, or whales)
may enhance the chances of capturing prey by acting
together. Prey, likewise, may enhance their individual
chances of avoiding predation by banding together. Infor-
mation about food may also be shared when it becomes
available in periodic, plentiful batches—as observed among
osprey, cliff swallows, weaver birds, crows, honeybees,
ants, termites, and others (Allchin 1992). Ultimately,
cooperation may enhance fitness, not necessarily diminish
it. Benefitting others need not involve individual cost.
• Some cases of "costly" helping are apparent only.
Helping that seems to involve cost, therefore, may justify
further analysis. Some cases of costly helping are indeed
apparent only. Costs that are observed in the short term may
be balanced by benefits in the long term.
For instance, when Florida scrub jays (Aphelocoma
coerulescens) reach reproductive age, they do not always
"leave home" and begin their own families. Rather, they
help raise their younger siblings: an apparent cost when
compared with their own reproductive potential. But the
context of reproduction is complex. Outcomes change with
a broader perspective. A male scrub jay must have his own
territory for foraging and nesting, and territory is limited.
Males who stay with their father can help gradually expand
the father's territory, which is eventually split between
father and son. This way, the son is better able to secure
good territory. Females, by contrast, compete for males
with the best territories. A female who can wait for
opportunity is able to select a better mate. In each case,
the scrub jay actually benefits reproductively in the long
term by staying at home and helping its parents reproduce
in the short term (Woolfenden and Fitzpatrick 1978, 1984).
Such reproductive helpers are found widely—in black-
backed jackals (Canis mesomelas), cichlid fish of Lake
Tanganyika (Lamprologus brichardi), gray-crowned bab-
blers of Australia (Pomatostomus temporalis), carrion
crows in Northern Spain (Corvis corone corone), and many
other species (Emlen 1978; Krebs and Davies 1993, pp
299–302; Clutton-Brock 2002; Baglione et al 2003). In all
cases, as with observed cooperation, benefits are partly
shared and ultimately outweigh any costs.
Misleading appearances of costly helping are also vividly
exemplified by colony defense in meerkats (Suricata
suricatta; Clutton-Brock et al. 1999). Meerkats, a type of
mongoose found in arid Southern Africa, typically live and
forage in groups. Some individuals serve as sentinels,
watching for predators and sounding a general alarm if one
is spotted. By vocalizing loudly, however, the sentinel
seems to alert any nearby predator and put herself at more
risk: an apparent costly act. Sustained and careful
observation, however, reveals that meerkats guard from
safe vantage points, where they can readily escape into a
burrow. In addition, sentinels are usually the first to detect
the predator, and they hide sooner than most others.
Vigilance limits foraging time, however. Meerkats tend to
adopt a guard role only when they are well fed. Sentinel
behavior can, thus, benefit the individual meerkat while
also benefitting others. The same pattern of sentinel
volunteering has been observed in the bird, the Arabian
babbler (Turdoides squamiceps; Wright et al. 2001), and
others. The behavior, evolutionarily speaking, seems costly
but is indirectly beneficial.
• Some cases of costly helping are explained by genetic
relatedness.
Considering larger contexts can inform analysis of
other cases of costly helping, as well. For example,
honeybees, and many wasps and ants, along with the
burrowing naked mole rats from Eastern Africa include
individuals that do not reproduce. Rather, they contribute
to the reproduction of a single individual in a social
setting. The failure to perpetuate one's own lineage seems
to contradict the principle of natural selection. Yet it is the
evolutionary context that also proves significant here. In a
broader scope, lineages include collateral relatives and
their descendants, who share on average certain percen-
tages of one's heritable traits. Under appropriate circum-
stances, contributions to their survival and reproduction
may well outweigh the individual's. In such cases, costly
behavior towards relatives may develop. Natural selection
is indirect. The helping traits are preserved and proliferate
through relatives, not direct offspring: kin selection. For
long-term evolution, a proper measure is thus not
individual fitness, but inclusive fitness, the total represen-
tation of one's traits in future generations (Hamilton
1964).
The outcome of kin selection is well illustrated by
honeybees (Apis melifera). Each hive is typically dominat-
ed by one large "queen" bee that reproduces. The other bees
are her offspring. While also female, they are sterile and
work in the hive supporting their sisters rather than mating
on their own. This behavior reflects the bees' distinctive
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genetics. The queen is haploid, the female workers (and
males) diploid. Paradoxically from a human perspective,
workers are more closely related to their sisters (75%) than
to their own children (50%)! When a honeybee dies
defending the hive, she increases the chances that the
queen and her many sisters—the lineage expressing her
traits—all continue. Through indirect kin selection, the
helping behavior, while costly, increases her inclusive
fitness. Many other insects exhibit similar genetics and,
not surprisingly, also similar social organization.
Naked mole rats (Heterocephalus glaber) also live in
colonies with just one much larger reproductive female.
Other females become sterile. As mammals, however, the
mole rats do not share the honeybees' genomic structure.
Yet they do live in family-based groups and are highly
inbred. Individuals in the same burrow typically share at
least 80% of their genes. Mole rat sociality itself seems an
adaptation to patchy food resources in an arid environment
(O'Riain and Faulkes 2008). Their striking breeding
structure, however, with its costly helping, seems shaped
by kin selection (Jarvis 1981; Sherman et al. 1991).
In Belding's ground squirrels (Spermophilus beldingi),
which inhabit mountain meadows in the western USA,
costly helping appears in the alarm calls of sentinels
watching for predators. Unlike meerkats, Belding's ground
squirrels that raise an alarm are more frequently preyed
upon. In this case, the ground squirrels in one area tend to
be closely related. They alert—and benefit—mostly their
kin. Relatedness among individuals varies, however, and
underlies significant differences in calling behavior. Males
tend to disperse from their place of birth, while females
remain local. Females, thus, have more kin neighbors than
males do, and accordingly, they devote more time to the
sentinel role. In addition, their alarm calls are more
numerous when only close relatives are nearby. While
alarm calls in general seem to have evolved based on
foraging in the open during the day, the pattern and
frequency of sentinel risks in the Belding's ground squirrels
seems to reflect kin selection (Sherman 1977; Shelley and
Blumstein 2004).
• Organisms can determine kin relatedness in many ways,
sometimes by indirect cues.
Kin selection can only be effective, of course, if
organisms can differentiate kin from non-kin (Grafen
1990). Since they cannot determine each other's genes
directly, kinship or degree of genetic relatedness must be
perceived indirectly, through vicarious clues (Campbell
1974). The case of Belding's ground squirrels illustrates
how locality may function as a substitute when kin tend to
inhabit the same area. For example, boobies on the
Galápagos Islands (Sula nebouxii) recognize their offspring
only by location: within a ring of guano that marks their
rudimentary nest. If a nestling falls outside the ring,
whether accidentally or by being pushed, it is treated as
non-kin and is neither cared for nor permitted to return
(Gould 1983). Vicarious indicators, thus, do not always
function optimally. European cuckoos and American cow-
birds, for instance, lay their eggs in the nests of other
species, where the host birds raise the chicks as if kin. Such
parasitism exploits the limits of an evolved system of kin
detection.
Another system for detecting kin indirectly is based on
similar traits. Side-blotched lizards in California (Uta
stansburgiana) have three throat colors: orange, yellow,
and blue. They establish mutually favorable territories
based on the throat visual cues, even when unrelated
individuals are mixed. Here, the trait seems to signal
genetic similarity, functioning as a substitute for actual
genetic relatedness (Sinervo and Clobert 2003). Again,
there is a slight displacement between kin and the cue for
detecting it: kin selection inevitably involves some
probability.
The ability of humans to ascertain kin has been
investigated recently with special regard to attitudes
towards incest and its avoidance. Primates, including
humans, are able to track kin relationships through
observed births—for example, younger (but not older)
siblings. They use this information in social interactions
(even if unconsciously). In other cases, siblings seem to use
years of cohabitation, regardless of whether they are
actually kin, as a vicarious indicator (Lieberman et al.
2003, 2007). While humans in most cultures tend to
associate in family groups, the role or extent of kin
selection remains an open question (considered further in
the sections below).
• Some cases of costly helping are explained, alternatively,
by reciprocity.
Kin selection cannot explain every costly act. Behaviors
that reduce individual fitness also occur among non-kin.
Context, again, is important. Other behaviors between the
same organisms may be relevant. Exchanges (as in other
cooperative mutualisms) may simply be displaced in time.
Namely, the recipient may later reciprocate, essentially
closing an unstated deal (Trivers 1971).
Such reciprocity, or deferred mutualism, is observed in
vampire bats (Desmodus rotundus; Wilkinson 1984, 1988,
1990). The bats cannot survive without food more than a
few days. But on any given night, 7–30% of the bats fail to
find a meal. A bat may then turn to a roostmate and nuzzle
its throat. On roughly five of eight occasions, the second
bat regurgitates a small amount of blood for the first bat.
Such sacrifices are not isolated acts, however. Eventually,
the donor bat fails to find food. Because bats frequently
return to the same roost, the same behavior can occur again,
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with the roles reversed. The "debt" is repaid. Reciprocity, or
the potential for such, is critical.
Reciprocity can occur at various levels of costs and
consequences. Grooming is not critical to survival, but it
occurs frequently in many primate species, even among
unrelated individuals. It is typically reciprocated by later
grooming or other social "favors." In one study of food
sharing in a chimpanzee troop, based on over 7,000
observed interactions, exchange was ultimately balanced
for each chimp pair (de Waal 1989). Among black hamlet
fish of the Caribbean (Hypoplectrus nigricans), the ex-
change involves reproduction. The fish are hermaphroditic;
they can both spawn and fertilize. The energy investment in
eggs is much greater than in sperm, however, so the
reproductive cost to the fish that lays eggs is greater. What
fosters reciprocity? Here, any laying of eggs is limited, and
successive matings depend on the alternation of male and
female roles (Krebs and Davies 1993, p. 285). Here, as
elsewhere, repeated encounters allow reciprocity.
As these examples may indicate, arrangements of
reciprocity can be fragile, susceptible to cheaters. Each
organism cannot always depend on the other to fulfill its
end of the "bargain." Such relationships have been modeled
using computers for repeated encounters among individuals
using various postures of cooperating or "defecting." An
individual that "reciprocates" by doing whatever the other
individual has done (whether to cooperate or not) seems to
be strategically most effective (Axelrod 1984). Such
simulations underscore the possible relevance of social
interactions, addressed below.
Moral Motivation or Intent (Neurophysiology
and Psychology)
Explaining moral outcomes alone does not address what
many consider most fundamental to morality: moral senti-
ments. An alternative approach to morality focuses on
feelings or reasoning at the level of mental phenomena
rather than on genetics (Sober and Wilson 1998). In
ordinary terms, morality may be less what you do so much
as why you do it: are your motives or intentions "good,"
regardless of the actual outcome? Adopting this perspective
introduces a whole new set of biological questions and
explanatory aims—and corresponding methods.
Mental phenomena pose a challenge for science. They
are not directly observable. Philosophers have relied
conventionally on introspection. In our daily lives, we also
make judgments about what other persons think, believe, or
intend or why they act. Both methods can be informative;
yet they are also limited and possibly misleading, especially
with animals. One common error is to anthropomorphize
animals or to interpret them idealistically in human terms.
Biologists must take care in documenting or mapping
behavior as a clear relationship between stimulus and
response. They learn from psychological, anatomical, and
physiological studies, especially using recently developed
neurological imaging technologies.
• Darwin proposed the moral sense as an inevitable
outcome of four elements: social instinct, memory, lan-
guage, and habit.
In describing the evolution of humans in Descent of
Man, Darwin (1871) prominently addressed mental and
moral abilities. Following cultural discourse at the time, he
focused on what he called the moral sense, or conscience,
notably reflected in the emotion of remorse. "Why do we
feel moral duty?" Darwin wondered. First, Darwin ob-
served that animals could evolve societies, structured (he
assumed) by a social instinct. Second, with multiple
instincts, behavior might not always accord with social
benefit. But memory, Darwin thought, would help resolve
such conflicts as the organism learned to regulate its
instincts, making the social instinct primary. Third, the
use of language would allow organisms to communicate
their needs clearly to one another. Fourth, repetition would
lead to habit and a spontaneous sense of what one "ought"
to do. While incomplete and flawed in some respects,
Darwin's early sketch remarkably identified many relevant
variables and processes, discussed further below.
• Nonhuman organisms exhibit sympathetic concern for
both kin and nonrelated individuals.
The first significant question in investigating the
evolution of moral motives is whether other species,
especially those closely related to humans, also express
such motives. Many relevant cases are documented. Some
of the most striking examples come from unexpected
observations, rather than formal scientific study. For
example, in 1996, Binti Jua, a female gorilla at the
Brookfield Zoo outside Chicago, rescued a 3-year-old child
that had fallen into her enclosure. Binti Jua cradled the
unconscious boy, just as she did her own child, growled at
another gorilla who approached her, and then carried the
boy about 20 meters to a door where the zookeeper could
retrieve the boy, all while her own daughter clung to her
back (Bils and Singer 1996; Anonymous 1996). The
incident echoed a similar case at England's Jersey Zoo in
1986 with a male gorilla named Jambo. While one might
want to dismiss these cases as mere stories, primatologist
Frans de Waal (1996b, 2005) defends their significance in
the context of similar, more systematic observations of
sympathy among primates in captivity and in the wild (both
episodes were recorded on home video).
De Waal (de Waal 1996a; de Waal and Aureli 1996) has
highlighted numerous other cases. For example, he
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describes Mozu, a snow monkey born without hands or feet
in a free-ranging troop in Japan. Mozu could not climb.
Still, the other members of Mozu's troop did not move in
the trees above her at a pace that would leave her behind,
despite their ability to do so. They seemed tolerant of
Mozu's handicap. Such observations add weight to the
notion that moral sentiments are rooted in human ancestry.
In an effort to understand the nature of such apparent
sympathy, Jules Masserman et al. (1963) investigated how
macaques responded to other monkey's suffering in a
laboratory environment. How would they behave if they
knew that securing food would give an electric shock to
another monkey? Masserman's monkeys often prolonged
their hunger rather than administer a painful stimulus. One
monkey refrained from taking food for 12 days. Responses
showed several patterns. Self-starvation was more likely in
monkeys that had themselves experienced electroshock as a
subject. Sacrificial behavior was not biased towards
members of higher dominance rank but was slightly
stronger for cagemates (although not statistically signifi-
cant). Visual contact, even without auditory cues, seemed
sufficient to induce the response. The monkeys' behavior
seemed to reflect an understanding of another's pain, as
well as strong aversion to causing such suffering (experi-
mental ethics have since become stricter and no one has
replicated this important early study in primates).
Mice, too, seem to show signs of proto-empathy in
expressing feelings modified by the feelings of others.
Experimentally, they exhibit increased sensitivity to mild
pain when cagemates (but not unfamiliar mice) also
experienced noxious stimuli at the same time. Again, visual
contact seems important in communicating an emotional
state and triggering a corresponding, even if not directly
sympathetic, response (Langford et al 2006).
Concern towards others may occur in more positive
contexts, as well. Common marmoset monkeys (Callithrix
jacchus) are cooperative breeders and strongly interdepen-
dent socially. When given an opportunity (with no personal
reward) in a laboratory setting, they provide food to other
individuals, even without reciprocity or genetic relatedness
(Burkart et al 2007). Unsolicited, other-regarding behavior
may thus occur without the more sophisticated cognitive
structures found in chimps and humans and without explicit
reciprocation.
• Humans and some other primates exhibit moral senti-
ments at a very early age.
One way to assess foundational human motivation is to
observe behavior before possible learning or training.
Human infants (age 18 months), for example, frequently
help adults in simple problematic tasks in a lab setting—
without being asked and without reward. Young chimps,
too (ages 3 to 4.5 years), exhibit the same behavior, at least
when they are able to understand the incomplete task
(Warneken and Tomasello 2006). A macaque (or rhesus
monkey, Macaca mulatta) of a captive troop, only a few
months old, was also observed hugging another younger
member who had just been assaulted sexually by one of the
adult males: apparent unsolicited consolation (de Waal
1996a). Simple moral tendencies seem innate in humans
and other primates, at least early in life. The question
remains how such feelings evolved and whether the social
environment was relevant historically (see section below).
• Moral thinking and feeling has a neurological basis.
Evolutionary understanding is typically informed by
analysis of structure and function. To further understand
moral behavior, then, biologists consider the anatomy and
physiology of the brain and nervous system (Pfaff 2007).
Perhaps the most fascinating case is a man who lost
some his social and moral bearing due to an unusual brain
injury: a railroad worker in the nineteenth century named
Phineas Gage. Gage was using his tamping iron to compact
an explosive charge when it detonated prematurely and sent
the 1.5-inch-wide rod up under his cheek bone, through his
brain, and out the top of his skull. Gage remarkably
survived, but he had lost some of his brain, and with it,
some of its function. Whereas before the accident Gage had
been "quiet and respectful," afterwards he became "fitful,
irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity
(which was not previously his custom), manifesting but
little deference for his fellows." The attending physician
profiled the dramatic change, noting that "the equilibrium
or balance, so to speak, between his intellectual faculties
and animal propensities, seems to have been destroyed"
(Harlow 1868, pp. 339, 340).
One can easily overstate the correspondence, as was done
at the time by one enthusiast for phrenology, a theory now
abandoned in disrepute. Persuaded that there were discrete
personality traits that mapped onto the surface of the skull,
he imagined that in Gage's brain, "the iron had passed
through the regions of the organs of BENEVOLENCE and
VENERATION…hence his profanity, and want of respect
and kindness" (Macmillan 2000, quote on p. 350).
Avoiding such speculative and unsubstantiated extreme
claims, one can still hope to identify how certain areas of
the brain may be associated with different dimensions of
moral mental activity, as illustrated broadly in Gage's case.
In recent years, neurological imaging techniques espe-
cially have proven useful in monitoring brain activity of
subjects in the midst of moral thinking. For example, the
ventromedial prefontal cortex shows activity when subjects
view images that evoke moral impressions but do not
require any actual moral judgment. This area has been
proposed as part of a network involving feelings related to
social interactions. People with damage to this area (such as
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Phineas Gage) are less able to integrate emotional informa-
tion into judgments that also involve an analysis of costs
and benefits, and their conclusions reflect a corresponding
bias. By comparison, when moral reflection turns to
interpreting and assessing other people's intentions, the
key brain area seems to be the right temporoparietal
junction. When moral problems become personal, the
medial frontal gyrus becomes more active. More abstract
or hypothetical problems, by contrast, tend to activate the
dorsolateral prefontal cortex and other areas. When such
different forms of thinking conflict, as one often finds in
moral dilemmas, activity rises in the anterior cingulate
cortex—perhaps serving a mediator role. Thinking in terms
of a single "moral organ" thus seems inappropriate. As
initially sketched by Darwin, multiple faculties seem
involved, distributed throughout the brain. Indeed, all
regions active in moral thinking have been implicated in
other nonmoral mental processes. None seems devoted
exclusively to moral thinking (Damasio et al 1994; Greene
and Haidt 2002; Miller 2008).
Neuroimaging studies show significantly that actual
moral reasoning involves both emotion and logic. Philos-
ophers have long debated which is (or should be) primary
in moral judgment. In practice, as least, both seem to be
relevant (Greene and Haidt 2002).
• Moral behaviors may be learned as part of an open
behavioral program.
A focus on neural processes, especially in contrast to
genetics, emphasizes the importance of open behavioral
programs. Not all behavior is innate, or closed, with narrow
predetermined stimulus-response patterns. With appropriate
neural structures, learning is possible. The flexibility
afforded by learned behavior allows organisms to respond
to local environments, which may change during an
organism's lifetime or vary from organism to organism
within the same species. Evolution may thus favor the
brain's potential for behavioral plasticity and for placing
"values" on certain responses. Moral behavior—or immoral
behavior—may be partly (or even largely) learned and
shaped by local social environments.
Open behavior systems lead to a new level of organiza-
tion: the psychological. To achieve plasticity, a learning
system needs to be decoupled from particular inherited
behaviors. Organic evolution can then act only at the level
of the whole learning system. Fitness is determined by how
well the system in its entirety performs, not whether each
and every behavior, gauged separately, enhances survival
and reproduction. Individual acts thus become relatively
insulated from direct natural selection. In addition, learning
has the potential to modify, or regulate, innate behavior or
dispositions. The psychological level thereby becomes
emergent, exhibiting new interactions and properties rela-
tively independent of lower level functions (genetic and
physiological) and able in part to influence them.
Organisms with open behavior accordingly achieve a
degree of autonomy (Murphy and Brown 2007). The
consequences for interpreting morality are profound. For
example, autonomous organisms may make authentic
choices (not strictly dictated by heredity). Emergence and
autonomy provide a biological context for interpreting
many major philosophical concerns: intention, agency, and
free will—which are only meaningful at the mental, or
psychological, level (Hofstadter 1979; Sterelny 2001).
Autonomy also leads to individual identity. Even
organisms with identical brains may behave uniquely, due
to different learning histories or environments. Cultural
variation is also possible. Organisms [with open behavior]
have the potential to develop a wide range of values,
whether moral or immoral, not determined strictly, or
exclusively, by their genes.
• Cooperation and helping behavior may be intentional.
Organisms with open behavior programs may thus
engage in cooperative and helping behavior, quite apart
from genetic reasons. For example, chimpanzees in a novel
laboratory setting that enables them to work together to
secure food collaborate. Given a choice, they recruit chimps
with the best history of cooperation, indicating their
understanding of cooperative behavior (Melis et al. 2006).
Similar behavior has also been documented in the crow-like
rooks of Europe (Corvis frugilegus; Holden 2008; Seed et al.
2008). Biologically, one distinguishes sharply between
genetic and psychological levels of helping (Sober and
Wilson 1998).
Cooperation at the psychological level is still susceptible
to cheating or defection. However, the problem is trans-
formed because individual organisms have the potential to
learn. The ability of organisms to interact leads biologists to
consider the social level more fully.
Moral Systems (Sociality and Communication)
A third important perspective on moral behavior addresses
the interactions of organisms and their social organization
(including what philosophers call an implicit social con-
tract). For example, behavioral genetics does not solve the
problem of selfish behavior spreading in groups where
innate reciprocity might arise. Psychological level consid-
erations alone leave open the question of what may be
learned and in what contexts. Relationships that emerge at
the social level can shape behavior in ways that resolve
these uncertainties. As Darwin suggested in 1871, human
behaviors may well be shaped by "the wishes, approbation,
and blame of his fellow-men" (p. 86).
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The most profound challenge to explaining moral
behavior seems the threat of cheaters. Selfish individuals
may proliferate by "free-riding" at the cost of sharers.
Economists encounter this problem when they discuss
public goods, intended to be distributed evenly, but freely
available for anyone to take a disproportionate share.
Philosopher Garret Hardin (1968) suggested that many
environmental problems develop because individuals will
tend to overuse or spoil a shared "commons" (public lands,
rivers, oceans, air) at everyone else's expense—resulting in
what he called the tragedy of the commons. Problems seem
inherent in any group trying to establish a pattern of sharing
behavior. Ultimately, selfishness seems always to subvert
cooperation. It may well seem an inescapable consequence
of the process of natural selection.
The problem arises, however, only when individuals act
independently of each other. In a social setting, blind
interactions can rarely be assumed. For example (as
described below), individuals may learn to interact selec-
tively: only with individuals that reciprocate or that are
known publicly as reliable cooperators—or they may
identify and punish violators. Social level interactions
dramatically alter the prospects for moral behavior.
• Organisms may cooperate selectively with reciprocators.
Organisms may guard against loss to cheaters by limiting
their interactions. Consider again the case of vampire bats.
Their observed system of blood exchange seems stable,
undisrupted by potential free-riders. Why? Here, the bats
tend to roost in the same colony, a very simple social
organization which forms a context for sustainable reci-
procity. The bats do not share blood unconditionally. They
are more likely to provide food for a bat that has fed them
on a previous occasion or that is a frequent roostmate. The
bats can recognize distinct individuals and remember past
events. They learn to identify cheaters. A bat that does not
repay previous "favors" does not get endless handouts. Bats
that cheat ultimately do not benefit. Defection is thereby
limited (Wilkinson 1984, 1988, 1990). Selective interaction
leads to network reciprocity, a social cluster of cooperators
insulated against invasion by selfish individuals (Nowak
and Sigmund 2005).
• Social organisms may enforce cooperation through
rewards and punishment.
Organisms may also actively punish noncooperators. For
example, in a free-ranging (semi-captive) colony of
macaques, or rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), on an
island off Puerto Rico, individuals call to the group when
they find food. Individuals that fail to call are frequently
discovered and, here, actively punished. They are more
likely to be bit, hit, chased, or rolled. Cheaters ultimately
eat less food. There are costs to deception (Hauser 1992).
Cooperation enforced through punishment yields strong
reciprocity. Such punishment has also been observed in the
cooperative breeding of fairy wrens and in the shared
nesting of paper wasps (Polistes fuscatus; Clutton-Brock
and Parker 1995). In these cases, interactions at the higher
social level regulate behavior, or stimulus-response pat-
terns, at the individual level.
Punishment seems important in human culture and
evolutionary history. When Darwin began considering the
evolution of morality, he reflected on a possible role for the
"fear of others acting in unison" and "the fear of
punishment" (M Notebook, p. 151; Darwin 1871, p. 92).
However, punitive behavior cannot be assumed. It costs
extra effort or resources. Humans, nonetheless, accept
personal cost to ensure group benefits in anonymous
experimental situations. Moreover, others respond to their
punitive actions (Fehr and Gächter 2002). A norm of
cooperation can be learned and enforced through punishment.
Punishment of selfish behavior seems present in all
human cultures. They include not only different nations on
different continents and Oceania but also cultures with
widely divergent environments, economies (from foraging
and pastoralism to industrialism), and residence patterns
(from nomadic to sedentary; Heinrich et al. 2006; Hermann
et al. 2008). Most important, perhaps, negative sanctions
are found in small mobile hunter-gatherer cultures—similar
to our Paleolithic ancestors—where they help maintain
egalitarian societies (Boehm 1999).
Selective interaction and punishment may combine.
When given the option, human subjects prefer to join
groups functioning cooperatively through sanctions over
groups where they are "free" to be selfish but can reap only
limited benefits (Güreck et al. 2006). Cooperative groups
are thus not necessarily at a relative disadvantage. Indeed,
mathematical models indicate that being able to choose
between such groups (or not join either) may have been
critical to the origin of punishment-based cooperation
(Hauert et al. 2007). As suggested by Hardin (1968), the
tragedy of the commons may be solved by "mutual
coercion, mutually agreed upon." Again, social-level
dynamics can affect how individuals act.
• Organisms may benefit from social information.
Another social response to cheaters is to gather infor-
mation about how other organisms behave—whether they
are trustworthy cooperators, say—and to act accordingly.
For example, one small cleaner fish (Labroides dimidiatus)
has a mutualism with large fish. The small fish eat parasites
on the large fish. Occasionally, however, they "cheat" and
feed on the host's mucus or nip a bit of its flesh. Other
potential host fish (or "clients"), however, can observe such
behavior. Such host fish show a preference for cleaner fish
that are demonstrably "honest." Accordingly, cleaner fish
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cheat less when bystanders are present (Bshary and Gutter
2006). Social "eavesdropping" also seems to keep defection
from cooperation in check.
Many animals, including humans, seem to collect infor-
mation on the behavior of other organisms. Observed
organisms, in turn, seem to modify their behavior when visual
clues, such as a pair of eyes, indicate that they are being
watched. Observers may then "spy" from concealed vantage
point to detect unbiased behavior. The value of the social
information is reflected in the responses and counter-
responses (Dally et al. 2006; Milinski and Rockenbach 2007).
Ultimately, social information allows image scoring or
evaluating of other organisms' behavior patterns. Reputa-
tion can matter. Cooperation can be guided by status, or
reputation, rather than instances of direct reciprocity.
Indirect reciprocity can evolve in a group with image
scoring (Nowak and Sigmund 1998, 2005)—and can also
effectively solve the problem of the tragedy of the
commons (Milinski and Rockenbach 2007).
• Variations in social and cognitive contexts shape helping
and cooperative behavior.
While helping and punitive behaviors seem universal
among humans, they do vary across cultures. Punishment
occurs more readily, for example, in societies with stronger
norms of cooperation (Heinrich et al 2006; Hermann et al.
2008). Social context affects cooperative behavior. Most
monkeys do not help others unless there is a personal
benefit. One might tend to attribute their behavior to limited
cognitive skills (when contrasted with great apes). Yet,
common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) in experimental
situations do retrieve food for others, even with no clear
benefit to themselves. Unlike closely related species,
however, the marmosets breed cooperatively. Their social
system (here, shared with the great apes) seems to provide a
context that fosters the helping behavior (Burkart et al.
2007).
As noted earlier, both chimps (primates) and rooks
(birds) can recruit helpers to perform joint tasks. But their
behaviors also differ, as do their social organizations.
Rooks do not seek or achieve cooperation as frequently as
chimps. Their social organization is also simpler. They form
single mating pairs that tend to remain for life. Chimps, by
contrast, shift mating partners and must also negotiate
political allegiances in an unstable dominance hierarchy.
The degree of cooperation in each case reflects the
respective social demands. In addition, cooperation among
individual pairs of rooks reflects their mutual tolerance in
other social encounters. Overall, the cooperative behavior is
closely linked to the social context (Seed et al. 2008).
The behavioral difference between early humans and
their closest primate relatives also seems based on social
organization. Chimps compete for both food and mates,
even within social groupings. Their societies are marked by
linear dominance hierarchies. Pairs sometimes form coali-
tions and significantly alter the balance of power. Larger
coalitions appear temporarily, but they too are limited in
scope. Chimp cooperative behavior is also limited and often
politically oriented. Altruism is rare. Early humans (around
100,000 years ago) were able to level these hierarchies.
Communication skills facilitated the coordination of large
coalitions that could effectively check the authority of
dominant individuals. Weapons, once developed for hunt-
ing, likely contributed further to equalizing power. Egali-
tarianism emerged, and with it, moral norms that could
shape further biological evolution. Human morality, too,
seems to reflect how the species is organized socially
(Boehm 1999).
• Effective communication enhances the social function of
moral behavior.
Social coordination among organisms, in general, is
enabled and further facilitated by communication. Moral
behavior is no exception. In sketching the possible roots of
moral responses, Darwin (1871) noted the role of organisms
being able to interpret the needs of others in order to assist
them. Darwin underscored the role of language, but he also
understood the role of less complex means. For example,
emotions are typically expressed externally, through ana-
tomically distinct postures or facial configurations. They
offer important clues about the internal mental states of
other organisms. Darwin followed Descent of Man with a
whole volume exploring The Expression of Emotions in
Humans and Other Animals (Darwin 1872/1965). Contem-
porary studies continue to document the importance of the
body and even of particular muscles in expressing
emotions, as well as in feeling and perceiving them among
others (Niendenthal 2007).
One of the most challenging communication tasks—
sometimes even with language—is interpreting the inten-
tion of others. This is a further dimension of managing
social information relevant to moral responses—for exam-
ple, in deceiving others or in detecting such deception.
Being able to interpret, or "mirror," another mind appears to
be quite a sophisticated cognitive skill. The abilities of
other primates and mammals in doing this are still being
debated (Zimmer 2003; Miller 2005; Pennisi 2006).
Communication and language are also integral, of
course, to sharing desires and ideas about ideal behavior
and thus to moral discourse. In the context of organisms
with open behavior programs, language also contributes
significantly to the transmission of culture and to the
learning of moral norms. Moral systems may thus not only
emerge socially but also perpetuate themselves culturally,
apart from specific genes or individual behavior patterns
(Richerson and Boyd 2005).
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• Social interactions may affect individual learning and
biological fitness.
Moral systems not only exhibit a degree of autonomy at
the social level but also provide an environment in which
individuals learn and natural selection acts. First, when an
organism (with an open behavior program) ventures into
trying new social behaviors, the environment of other group
members will be part of reinforcing them, positively or
negatively. Successful (or failed) reciprocities and punish-
ment (or rewards), for example, will shape what is learned.
Appropriate social contexts will tend to foster helpful or
cooperative behavior. Further learning through observation
and imitation will then tend to amplify socially successful
behavior.
Second, social interactions provide an environment for
biological selection as well. Innate dispositions—such as
extending sympathy beyond kin, an unschooled tendency to
try helpful behavior, or readiness to punish (see above)—
may enhance survival and reproduction in certain social
environments. Social environments may also promote
general traits that enhance social or moral behavioral
abilities, such as improved language skills ("reading"
emotions, interpreting signals, articulating needs, etc.),
perceptual skills in differentiating group members, or
memory. Indeed, anthropological evidence indicates that
we have inherited many such tendencies and skills from our
primate and early hominid ancestors (Boehm 1999;
Richerson and Boyd 2005). Society and morality may
ultimately be forces in evolution as much as they are
products of it.
Summary and Application
• Biologists can explain morality on multiple levels.
As genetic behavior, moral outcomes are explained
alternately by kin selection or reciprocity. As a psycholog-
ical motive or intent, morality is explained by open learning
systems shaped by emotion and reasoning from experience.
As a social system, morality is explained by mutual
accountability among individuals or by selective interaction
based on social information. Processes at each level provide
a context in which the others function.
• Higher levels of organization limit reductionistic explana-
tions of behavior.
Understanding how morality as a behavior is explained
on multiple levels is valuable for correcting some wide-
spread but misleading popular beliefs about evolution and
culture. Many persons portray evolution as nothing more
than a fiercely competitive "struggle for existence." They
render nature and culture alike as governed by an
unqualified "survival of the fittest." Such conclusions are
based on the mistaken doctrine of biological determinism,
the flawed assumption that all behavior reduces simply to
genes (Gould 1981; Lewontin et al. 1984; Lewontin 1993;
Rose 1997). Such a view disregards the relevance of
learned behaviors at the psychological level and the
regulation of behavior by interactions at the social level.
Biological determinism fails by not acknowledging the role
of emergence, the appearance of new dynamics at higher
levels of organization (Holland 1998; Camazine et al.
2001). Interactions at these levels may generate new
relationships and new properties. They may create a system
that functions on its own principles and can modify how
component parts act. For example, social punishment limits
individual "selfishness." Learning can disarm any geneti-
cally based defection. Psychology and sociology, as distinct
fields, thus complement standard biology in studying
behavior.
Once one becomes aware of mutualisms between
species, reciprocities among individuals within a species,
and the potentials of open behavioral programs, the view of
natural selection as universally "selfish" is clearly too
narrow. Kin selection among Belding ground squirrels or
honeybees may inform our understanding of the evolution
of morality, but it does not map or determine human
behavior. Human psychology establishes its own values.
Human society establishes its own laws. Humans are not
enslaved by some stereotyped "law of the jungle" (despite
the premise of some "reality" television shows!).
• Cultural bias may generate error in science, with adverse
effects beyond science.
As a flawed doctrine, biological determinism also has
significant political overtones not justified by science.
Characterizing society as "merely" biological implies that
any social organization—disparity in wealth, for example—
is inherent in nature and cannot be changed. The appeal
to nature obscures how human interaction or politics—at
the social level—contributes to the outcome. Biological
determinist claims function socially to preserve the status
quo: to protect power and acquired wealth and to
peripheralize moral analysis. Further, the appeal to
science and its authority implies that the view is proven
and cannot be challenged, further concealing the role of
human politics.
Biological determinism ultimately tries to present
certain values as based on facts of nature. Accordingly,
it also reflects another error, the naturalistic fallacy: the
effort to find or extract values from the facts of nature.
This error has a long history, going back at least to
Herbert Spencer in the late 1800s. He claimed that
laissez-faire social ideology was based on his biologized
psychology and sociology and on Darwinian evolution
(Spencer 1851, 1852a, b, 1864; Moore 1903). The same
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error is found today when someone argues that some value
or moral principle is justified because a certain trait is (so
they claim) universal, or innate, or reflects "human
nature." But frequency does not establish value. Such
appeals typically indicate that the scientist is trying to
inscribe his or her own cultural prejudice into the "facts"
of nature: a threat to sound science called the naturalizing
error (Allchin 2008). Facts of nature may surely inform
moral reasoning and justification. But nature does not
yield values on its own.
• Biologically, humans have multiple moral potentials.
Morally, humans have multiple behavioral potentials.
Despite some predispositions, they do not seem bound
by their genes to be either selfish or cooperative. They
exhibit the emotional and cognitive tools for both.
Evolution seems to have generated sometimes conflicting
motives. Processes at different levels of organization,
especially, may foster contrary tendencies. Perhaps this is
why philosophers and others, even after many centuries,
continue to debate the nature of morality. Ultimately, it
seems, humans exercise their cognitive and emotional
potential by finding their own ethical trajectory, both
individually and collectively.
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